The paper suggests a straight solution to the problem of meaning skepticism presented in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The solution is based on Ladov’s moderate solution to the problem. Ladov’s solution is to the effect that the total skepticism cannot be a theory because it cannot be stated without performative contradiction. This entails that only a limited skepticism is possible as a theory. I argue that the limited skepticism is compatible with the view that meaning can be (...) known provided the knowledge of meaning is construed as an internal part of a speech act, not as a result of interpretation of behavioral facts. (shrink)

The paper presents a holistic notion of speech act and demonstrates its relevance for the straight solution to Kripke’s problem. Besides, the author replies to some comments and objections presented by the participants of the discussion.

Phylogenetic systematics is one of the most important analytical frameworks of modern Biology. It seems to be common knowledge that within phylogenetics, ‘groups’ must be defined based solely on the synapomorphies or on the “derived” characters that unite two or more taxa in a clade or monophyletic group. Thus, the idea of synapomorphy seems to be of fundamental influence and importance. Here I will show that the most common and straightforward understanding of synapomorphy as a shared derived character is not (...) sufficient and eventually must be rejected in favor of Nelson’s relational interpretation of such term. Arguing for this point and using three examples from previously published Apes’ genomic matrices, I explicitly demonstrate that the relationship )) with Hylobatidae as a sister taxon, may be successfully recovered by three-taxon statement analysis and three-taxon statement average consensus analysis even if all of the evident standard shared derived molecular characters of the relationship )) with Hylobatidae as a sister taxon, have been excluded from the molecular alignments. Neither conventional Maximum Parsimony nor Maximum Likelihood or Bayesian Inference can do this in such situation. Thus, our results show that the relationship )) with Hylobatidae as a sister taxon has appeared, in some way, behind standard shared derived characters: the last ones could be excluded, but the relationship remains the same. (shrink)

In ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ (1956), Quine demonstrated that the naïve model-theoretic formalization of belief ascriptions de re, applied to cases of recognition failure, produces two unwelcome effects: 1) the seeming inconsistency of belief systems ascribed to rational agents, and 2) the contradictoriness of some (apparently well justified) belief reports. In the paper under discussion, Domanov claims that proof-theoretical formalization of belief ascriptions, based on the constructive type theory, precludes those effects. I challenge this claim by showing that the formalism (...) used by him reproduces at least the first of them. I suggest that this is so because of the identifying of variables from different contexts in Domanov’s definition of context extension functions. (shrink)

The latest book by Russian philosopher Sergey Mareev consists of two parts: recollections of his teacher Evald Ilyenkov, and reflections on some of the key themes of Ilyenkov’s philosophical heritage. The author traces several polemical lines related to the problem of the ideal, dialectics of the abstract and the concrete, the principle of historicism, as well as Ilyenkov’s interpretation of Spinoza and Hegel.

The latest book by Russian philosopher Sergey Mareev consists of two parts: recollections of his teacher Evald Ilyenkov, and reflections on some of the key themes of Ilyenkov’s philosophical heritage. The author traces several polemical lines related to the problem of the ideal, dialectics of the abstract and the concrete, the principle of historicism, as well as Ilyenkov’s interpretation of Spinoza and Hegel.

The two volumes of letters by Mikhail Lifschitz, recently published in Russian, reveal for the first time certain aspects of his relationship with György Lukács and his general intellectual and cultural role in the long history of Soviet aesthetics. The first volume contains all the known letters between Lifschitz and Lukács; the second volume contains the letters from Lifschitz to three of his younger colleagues. Both volumes throw considerable light on the development of Marxist aesthetics in the Soviet Union from (...) the 1930s to the 1980s. The extensive commentaries and notes provide context for the various discussions in the letters and situate the main issues under consideration within the wider historical and social context of the period. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis study reconsiders scientists’ identity in terms of vocation vs. profession, proceeding from Max Weber’s differentiation between science as profession and science as an inner calling fo...

The fundamental Hennigian principle, grouping solely on synapomorphy, is seldom used in modern phylogenetics. In the submitted paper, we apply this principle in reanalyzing five datasets comprising 197 complete plastid genomes (plastomes). We focused on the latter because plastome-based DNA sequence data gained dramatic popularity in molecular systematics during the last decade. We show that pattern-cladistic analyses based on complete plastid genome sequences can successfully resolve affinities between plant taxa, simultaneously simplifying both the genomic and analytical frameworks of phylogenetic studies. (...) We developed “Matrix to Newick” (M2N), a program to represent the standard molecular alignment of plastid genomes in the form of trees or relationships directly. Thus, massive plastome-based DNA sequence data can be successfully represented in a relational form rather than as a standard molecular alignment. Application of methods of median supertree construction (the Average Consensus method has been used as an example in this study) or Maximum Parsimony analysis to relational representations of plastome sequence data may help systematist to avoid the complicated assumption-based frameworks of Maximum Likelihood or Bayesian phylogenetics that are most used today in massive plastid sequence data analyses. We also found that significant amounts of pure genomic information that typically accommodate the majority of current plastid phylogenomic studies can be effectively dropped by systematists if they focus on the pattern-cladistics or relational analyses of plastome-based molecular data. The proposed pattern-cladistic approach is a powerful and straightforward heuristic alternative to modern plastome-based phylogenetics. (shrink)

This is a reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin, S.V. Shibarshina “Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science”. The comprehension of the general philosophical problems of scientific rationality is inextricably linked with the creative development of the world. An actual philosophical position can be formed on the basis of the intersection of several alternative approaches. The first is connected with the understanding of rationality as a special style of thinking of the epoch, in which the coordinate system of the (...) worldview is set. Such rationality sets general ideas about the cognizability of the world, and forms methodological and theoretical scientific strategies. Rationality outlines the boundaries of a scientist’s creative thought. Addressing the problem of the rationality of scientific creativity involves the use of a second approach, on the basis of which we can talk about the use of a variety of logics in describing the world. At the same time, confidence in their connection with reality allows us to hope for the formation of a holistic description of the problem in the future. In this case, we are dealing with an act of cognitive activity, as a result of which our consciousness throws a rational construct as a network on a situation of uncertainty, explaining and mastering it – the picture of the world is ordered. According to the third position, the evaluation of scientific results is flexible, plastic in nature: what is perceived as methodologically erroneous today may turn out to be a scientific discovery tomorrow. Thus, it can be stated that the creative thinking of the researcher is inscribed in certain cultural conditions of understanding reality, and this situation has a rationally given meaning. At the same time, the human mind always strives beyond the limits of the definable and categorically set, with the help of rationality, progressively groping the boundaries of the unknown and going beyond the limits of the possible. (shrink)

In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a (...) kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity. (shrink)

In his article Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s sceptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make it (...) vulnerable to sceptical attacks and accusations of petitio principii. (shrink)

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and (...) everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only. (shrink)

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’, that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence (...) is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus ; this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4. (shrink)

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the (...) denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance. (shrink)

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's (...) view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items. (shrink)

Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out (...) for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents. (shrink)

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the (...) causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta, before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves (...) a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter. (shrink)

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, (...) Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance. (shrink)

This essay explores the aspects of the Aristotelian psuchē that accounts for its contemporary appeal. The poverty of the notion of the mind is discussed. The superiority of the psuchē over the mind is emphasized.

The glorious anniversary of the great victory of the Soviet people and their heroic armed forces over the most aggressive armies of international imperialism provides a perspective that makes it possible to see the importance of this feat on the scale of world history, in the vivid light of the favorable influence it has exercised on all the subsequent development of sociopolitical processes on earth.

Among the numerous philosophical problems associated with analysis of the current revolution in science and technology, the problem of the revolution in the productive forces of society holds a place of importance. The revolution in science and technology brought the problem of the revolution in the productive forces into the foreground, along with the problems of the social revolution as a revolution in the entire system of societal relations.